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Introduction  
The objectives of national state aid policies are increasingly predetermined at the European 
level. In its 2005 State Aid Action Plan (SAAP), for example, the European Commission calls 
for a “modernised state aid policy in the context of the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs” 
and  sets  out  its  own  vision  of  “key  priorities”  for  national  state  aid  policy  (European 
Commission  2005).  At  the  national  level,  empirical  evidence  indicates  a  considerable 
convergence  of  state  aid  policies  towards  so-called  “horizontal”  objectives  such  as 
environmental  protection  and  social  cohesion,  as  opposed  to  sectoral  objectives  such  as 
maintaining employment in an unprofitable firm. Based on comparative data from the EU 
State Aid Scoreboard, the Commission concludes: “The clear move towards ‘better targeted 
aid’ continues with almost two thirds of Member States now awarding more than 90 percent 
of their aid to horizontal objectives” (European Commission 2007b: 4).  
This  trend  of  convergence  is  puzzling,  as  major  contributions  to  integration  theory 
would  lead  us  to  see  it  as  both  undesirable  and  unlikely.  European  competition  policy, 
including state aid control, is typically regarded to constitute one of the core areas of negative 
integration  –  aiming  at  eliminating  distortions  of  competition  rather  than  harmonizing 
national economic policies (cf. Scharpf 1999: 49; Wallace 2005: 80). Economically liberal 
authors have persistently argued for the primacy of such market-making goals in the process 
of  European  integration  (Majone  2005:  143-161;  Majone  1996;  Streit/Mussler  1995). 
According to their view, European competences in the field of state aid are restricted to the 
protection of competition and do not permit European intervention in favor of specific targets 
of national state aid policy (von Danwitz 2000: 16). While Scharpf is critical of economic 
liberalism, he provides an institutional explanation as to why we observe this asymmetry of 
European integration, privileging negative over positive integration goals. On the one hand, 
Treaty rules on market freedoms and competition policy have been progressively interpreted 
by non-majoritarian, supranational actors: the Commission and the European Courts. On the   3 
other hand, majority or unanimity requirements in the Council and in the European Parliament 
make it relatively difficult to reach agreement upon secondary rules, mostly those related to 
issues of positive integration (Scharpf 1999: 52f., 70f.). 
This  article  argues  that  ambiguous  Treaty  rules  and  heterogeneous  Member  States’ 
preferences have enabled the Commission to act as a supranational entrepreneur, not only 
enforcing  the  prohibition  of  distortive  state  aid,  but  also  partially  creating  positive 
integration “from above.” The article has three parts, with the first describing the institutional 
setting and the main actors’ interests in the field of state aid. From the beginnings of the 
integration  process,  European  Treaty  rules  have  constituted  a  rather  vague  compromise 
between different, often conflicting views on national state aid policy and its supranational 
control.  In  balancing  the  general  prohibition  on  state  aid  against  possible  exceptions,  the 
Commission has always had to assess, at least implicitly, not only the effects that a certain 
state aid measure would have on competition, but also its potential contributions to other 
policy goals such as competitiveness or cohesion. The second part of the article shows how 
the Commission has sought to establish more general criteria for the state aid measures that it 
deems compatible with the common market, in order to prevent or to settle political conflict 
about individual state aid decisions. By codifying these criteria into a complex system of soft 
law and, more recently, hard law, the Commission has not only shielded itself from political 
pressure and reduced its workload in individual cases, but has also developed a more or less 
explicit model of what it considers to be “good” state aid policy with regard to the “common 
interest” at the European level rather than at Member state level. The concluding section will 
summarize the major findings and discuss the limits of positive integration from above. 
State aid control and state aid policy in conflict  
European Treaty law appears to allocate clear competences in the field of state aid between 
two main actors. On the one hand, the Commission has the task of controlling national state   4 
aid in order to prevent distortions of competition in the internal market. On the other hand, it 
remains the Member States’ exclusive competence to design and to execute their individual 
aid policies, as long as they do not violate European competition law. In practice, however, 
this  distinction  is  far  from  clear-cut.  First,  the  scope  of  the  state  aid  prohibition  and  the 
procedure for its enforcement are contested. Second, the possibility of exempting state aid 
measures from the general prohibition gives rise to conflict about which types of state aid 
should still be admissible. It is this second type of conflict – arising not only between the 
Commission and EU Member States, but also within the Commission – which is increasingly 
predetermined by means of soft and hard state aid law.  
Conflicts about the prohibition of state aid 
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty generally prohibits:  
“any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods … 
insofar as it affects trade between Member States.” 
Despite this prohibition, state aid control was seen as the “poor relative” of European cartel 
and merger control for a long time (Hansen et al. 2004: 182). While the Member States had 
agreed, in principle, on the need for supranational state aid control, each of them had an 
incentive to deviate from common state aid discipline, particularly in times of economic crisis 
(Lavdas and Mendrinou 1999: 29f.). The existing literature stresses the important role played 
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in empowering the Commission against the resistance 
of Member States (Smith 1998; Lehmkuhl 2008).  
Member  States  initially  circumvented  European  state  aid  control  by  resorting  to 
“creative”  forms  of  state  aid.  Rather  than  granting  direct  subsidies,  they  conceded  tax 
privileges,  abstained  from  collecting  social  security  contributions  or  sold  public  property 
under market value in order to favor particular enterprises. Reacting to this, the Commission 
interpreted the scope of the state aid prohibition broadly, including not just advantages from   5 
direct grants but also other, more indirect forms having the same aid effect (Plender 2003). 
Although in most cases the ECJ supported the Commission’s Treaty interpretations, it also 
defined clear limits on European state aid control. For example, the ECJ ruled in its 2001 
PreussenElektra judgment that regulatory privileges not involving any budgetary burden for 
the state were not covered by the state aid prohibition.  
Member  States  also  informed  the  Commission  only  selectively  about  new  state  aid 
measures or simply ignored the Commission’s prohibitions, without significant risk. Based on 
an earlier ECJ ruling, however, the Commission started in 1983 to oblige Member States to 
recover illegally granted state aid from the benefiting enterprises (Smith 1998: 64). Moreover, 
by mobilizing competitors to complain about state aid beneficiaries, the Commission gained 
information independently from national policy makers, making it less likely that state aid 
could be granted secretly (Smith 1998: 63, 2001: 224).  
Arguably, state aid control today is more deeply integrated than had been foreseen by 
the  Member  States  when  the  Treaties  of  Rome  were  drafted,  and  in  most  cases  non-
compliance with European state aid rules is too costly to be an option (Smith 1998: 61). By 
adopting the Procedural Regulation No. 659/1999, the Member States finally accepted their 
obligation not to grant state aid without prior Commission consent and acknowledged the 
Commission’s competence to order recovery of illegal aid.  
The link between the two different sets of conflicts on state aid control and state aid 
policy now becomes clear: the harder it gets for the Member States to circumvent European 
state  aid  control  and  the  costlier  it  gets  to  simply  ignore  it,  the  more  politically  salient 
becomes the question of which types of state aid are still considered to be admissible in the 
common market.    6 
Conflicts about admissible state aid 
European  Treaty  rules  do  not  absolutely  prohibit  state  aid.  Articles  87(2)  and,  more 
importantly in practice, 87(3) of the EC Treaty provide the exceptions to the rule, thereby 
leaving room for maneuver on national state aid policies. Article 87(3) of the EC Treaty lists 
certain categories of aid that “may be considered to be compatible with the common market”:  
“(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or 
where there is serious underemployment;  
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State;  
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such 
aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest” 
As becomes clear from these provisions, EC Treaty rules on state aid leave plenty of room for 
interpretation. Which types of state aid can still be justified as compatible with the internal 
market, even if they distort competition? Who will determine the compatibility of certain 
types of state aid, and by what standards? 
The potential for conflicts of interest regarding admissible state aid is immense. State 
aid policy can be justified for reasons of both allocative efficiency and redistributive justice. 
The economics of when state aid is likely to increase allocative efficiency by correcting a 
particular  market  failure  are  far  from  uncontroversial  (Friederiszick  et  al.  2006:  13–15; 
Koenig  and  Füg  2005).  Just  how  far  state  aid  should  serve  redistributive  goals  is  not  an 
economic or legal question; the answer rests largely on political considerations (Friederiszick 
et al. 2006: 15–19). What is more, efficiency (or social welfare) and social justice can have 
very different meanings depending on what the word “social” refers to. A measure that looks 
efficient from a national point of view does not necessarily enhance European welfare if it 
produces negative externalities in other Member States. For example, a region that seems 
relatively rich compared to other European countries can be among the poorer regions of the   7 
country it belongs to; depending on the applicable standard of social justice, this region might 
qualify for redistributive state aid.  
The ambiguity of EC Treaty law reflects this diversity of interests, summarized in Table 
1. In practice, however, Treaty law provides little guidance on how to balance the goal of 
undistorted competition against the efficiency and equity considerations of national policy 
makers  (e.g.  referring  to  admissible  state  aid  for  “the  development  of  certain  economic 
activities or of certain economic areas,” emphasis added).  
 
Table 1     Multiple policy goals in the field of state aid 
  Policy function 
 
  Market making 
 
Market correction 
 
Redistribution 
 
Specific goal 
 
Competition 
 
Competitiveness 
 
Cohesion 
 
State aid policy 
 
State aid prohibition 
 
R&D aid, SME aid, 
environmental aid 
Regional aid 
 
Commission  DG COMP  DG ENTR 
 
DG REGIO 
 
Member States 
 
Netherlands, Estonia 
 
Sweden, Denmark 
 
Germany (New 
Länder), Poland 
Enterprises 
 
Competitors 
 
State aid beneficiaries 
 
 
Even  within  the  Commission,  the  potential  positive  effects  of  national  state  aid  are 
controversial. State aid control affects many different policies – represented by different DGs 
(Directorates General) in the Commission – and thus conflicts with Community goals other 
than just competition (Cini and McGowan 1998: 42–45). For example, the DG for Regional 
Policy  (DG  REGIO)  has  repeatedly  criticized  the  DG  for  Competition  (DG COMP)  for 
marginalizing the positive, redistributive aspects of regional state aid (Lavdas and Mendrinou 
1999: 40; Cini and McGowan 1998: 147). As a result, the revision of soft law on regional aid 
has been synchronized with the planning period for the Structural Funds and the criteria for 
designating eligible regions have been partly harmonized (Wishlade 2003: 145–179). The DG   8 
Enterprise and Industry (DG ENTR) has been pushing for a less restrictive approach towards 
state  aid  to  promote  investment  in  research,  development,  and  innovation  (Maincent  and 
Navarro 2006: 46–48). Depending on whether Commission officials are charged primarily 
with  executive  or  administrative  tasks,  they  will  be  more  or  less  open  to  political 
considerations beyond their own portfolio (Cini and McGowan 1998: 45). Finally, the Legal 
Service internally controls the legal compatibility of Commission drafts with the Treaty law 
and  has  a  “reputation  for  caution  …  trying  to  restrain  Commission  activism”  (Cini  and 
McGowan 1998: 44).  
Despite these internal conflicts, the Commission tries to speak with one voice in its 
negotiations  with  Member  States.  Drafts  of  new  or  revised  state  aid  rules  are  discussed 
internally before the Member States are consulted. Once a common Commission position is 
defined, it is defended in positive sum terms (“common interest”, “win-win developments”, 
European Commission 2005) and the potential for conflict is de-emphasized. For example, in 
its  reports  on  competition  policy  the  Commission  has  repeatedly  denied  conflicts  or 
contradictions between competition policy on the one side and regional or industrial policy on 
the  other  side.  Moreover,  while  Article  87(3)(c)  of  the  EC  Treaty  establishes  a  negative 
condition, requiring admissible aid not to distort competition “to an extent contrary to the 
common  interest”,  a  positive  interpretation  of  “common  interest”  dominates  in  practice: 
“State  aid  may  be  declared  compatible  with  the  Treaty  provided  it  fulfils  clearly  defined 
objectives of common interest and does not distort intra-community competition and trade to 
an extent contrary to the common interest” (European Commission 2005: 4, emphasis in the 
original document).  
With regard to questions above, it is therefore fair to assume that the Commission’s 
position is the following: first, it sees itself as competent to decide conflicts about which types 
of  state  aid  are  still  admissible  and  enjoys  significant  discretion  in  doing  so  (“may  be 
considered  to  be  compatible”,  Article  87[3]  of  the  EC  Treaty,  emphasis  added).  Second,   9 
according  to  the  Commission,  admissible  state  aid  has  to  be  justified  with  reference  to 
European rather than national standards. Both positions are also supported by the rulings of 
the European courts (Heidenhain 2003: 193f.).  
The Member States’ positions on state aid policies vary considerably more than even 
within the Commission. Similarly to the Commission’s DGs, divisions exist between different 
ministries. Unsurprisingly, ministries of finance tend to be less positive about state aid than 
will  other  ministries  entrusted  to  promote  industrial  or  regional  development.  Hence, 
ministers of finance may sometimes see DG COMP as an ally in order to fend off special 
interests inside or outside their own governments by referring to the constraints of European 
state aid control (Friederiszick et al. 2006: 24). More importantly, industrial policy traditions 
greatly differ between EU Member States, ranging from countries with very restrictive state 
aid policies to other countries in which state aid is not only used to address market failures but 
also for redistributive purposes (Dylla 1998). For example, state aid levels in the Netherlands 
or in the UK have consistently been clearly below the EU average; Estonia hardly has any 
state aid policy at all. In their comment on the SAAP, UK officials advocate a more restrictive 
approach towards state aid policy and argue “that State aid is generally only justified as a 
response to market failure” (emphasis in the original document).
1 Countries like Sweden or 
Denmark grant significant amounts of state aid, targeted almost exclusively towards goals of 
market correction, e.g. towards measures of environmental protection. Since reunification, 
German state aid policy after reunification has been largely redistributive, supporting regional 
development  and  industrial  restructuring  in  the  new  Länder  (Schütte  and  Hix  1995). 
Similarities exist between German state aid policy after reunification and the policy of some 
new Member States such as Poland. In their comments on the SAAP, Polish authorities have 
criticized the Commission for not giving enough consideration to the particular economic and 
social conditions of its transition economy.    10 
Member States vary greatly in their opinions on which types of state aid should still be 
admissible in the internal market. In contrast to the different DGs, EU Member States do not 
establish a common position before entering consultations on new state aid rules proposed by 
the Commission. However heterogeneous these state aid policy traditions may be, we can 
broadly distinguish two phases of Member States’ positions on the Commission’s competence 
to  decide  conflicts  about  admissible  aid.  Member  States  originally  contested  the 
Commission’s efforts to establish general criteria for admissible state aid, and the Council 
rejected the proposed secondary legislation (Lavdas and Mendrinou 1999: 29f.). Given the 
tightening of European state aid control since the late 1980s, however, Member States have 
adopted a more positive attitude towards European rules on admissible aid. Such rules at least 
improve legal certainty and reduce conflicts at the European and Member state levels about 
which  possibilities  for  national  state  aid  policies  remain.  The  next  section  analyzes  the 
historical development of soft and hard state aid rules in greater detail.  
Conflict management through soft and hard law 
The vagueness of the EC Treaty rules creates many conflicts between state aid control and 
state aid policy. At the same time, the need for interpretation of the Treaty rules and the 
heterogeneity of Member states’ interests have become major sources of the Commission’s 
power. After the Council refused to agree upon secondary legislation, the Commission started 
to  develop  this  framework  via  soft  law.  In  developing  its  soft  law,  the  Commission  has 
increasingly defined positive European standards of what it considers to be “good” state aid 
policy.  Since  1998,  previously  soft  rules  have  gradually  been  transformed  into  directly 
applicable regulations which exempt certain categories of state aid from Commission control. 
Thus, possible exceptions to the state aid prohibition become harmonized at the European 
level.    11 
Making a virtue of necessity 
Soft law was not the Commission’s first choice in the area of state aid control. On the basis of 
Article 89 of the EC Treaty, the Council may – on proposal by the Commission and after 
consulting  the  European  Parliament  –  adopt  secondary  legislation  on  European  state  aid 
control. Two early Commission draft regulations, however, were blocked by the Council in 
1966  and  1972.  In  reaction  to  the  Council’s  unwillingness  to  agree  upon  secondary 
legislation,  the  Commission  changed  its  approach  in  favor  of  “a  flexible  strategy  of 
enforcement  aiming  at  utilising  the  absence  of  a  Council  Regulation  in  the  direction  of 
gradually forming a practice founded on the Commission’s political sense of possible impact” 
(Lavdas and Mendrinou 1999: 30). Along with individual state aid decisions, soft law became 
the main instrument of this strategy.  
The legal basis of soft state aid law has been controversial for a long time (Aldestam 
2004). As a result of an ECJ judgement on the transparency directive, European secondary 
rules must explicitly refer to a legal basis in order to bind the Member States. Today, the 
Commission  constantly  refers  to  its  state  aid  frameworks  and  guidelines  as  “appropriate 
measures” in the sense of Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty. Based on this Treaty provision and 
without explicit approval by the Member States, however, appropriate measures only have the 
status  of  non-binding  Commission  recommendations.  For  this  reason  these  rules  are 
constantly referred to as soft rules “which, in principle, have no legally binding force but 
which  nevertheless  may  have  practical  effects”  (Snyder  1994:  198;  Cini  2001;  European 
Commission 2007a). By contrast, the Commission is bound to follow its own guidance in 
making  decisions  (Mestmäcker  and  Schweitzer  2004:  1108f.).  The  European  Courts  may 
reject a state aid decision if they find that the Commission has not correctly applied its own 
soft law (Lehmkuhl 2008: 145), yet this is a source of power, rather than a weakness of the 
Commission,  as  it  increases  the  credibility  of  the  self-binding  rules  (Smith  1998:  66f.).   12 
Crucially,  however,  the  Courts  largely  abstain  from  reassessing  the  economic  and  social 
reasoning underlying the Commission’s state aid rules and decisions.  
Reacting  to  the  Council’s  initial  refusal  to  adopt  secondary  legislation,  and 
unanticipated by the Member states, the Commission has made a virtue of necessity. Most 
authors  as  well  as  Commission  officials  themselves  stress  the  procedural  improvements 
resulting from state aid soft law. In contrast to a pure case-by-case approach, the soft-law 
approach has increased time-effectiveness, legal certainty and transparency of Commission 
control (Rawlinson 1993; Cini 2001: 199; Lehmkuhl 2008: 143f.). By binding itself to soft 
law, the Commission has also decreased its exposure to political pressure in individual state 
aid decisions: “The Commission needs rules to discipline itself. Rules are the best safeguard 
against  political  decisions  which,  if  they  were  to  proliferate,  would  destroy  all  state  aid 
control” (Rawlinson 1993: 58). At the same time, soft law allows for more discretion and 
flexibility in developing the rules than a rigid hard law approach (Cini 2001: 199, 205). 
What has been noted less prominently, however, is the substantive aspect of these rules. 
In  dealing  with  the  exceptions  to  the  state  aid  prohibition,  they  “imply  a  positive  … 
dimension  to  the  policy  which  has  in  practice  proved  extremely  controversial”  (Cini  and 
McGowan 1998: 18). Conflicts of interest do not disappear from the field of state aid control; 
instead, they are partly shifted from the control of individual state aid measures to the design 
or revision of soft state aid rules. Essentially, soft state aid rules are conflict-solving devices, 
harmonizing the standards of admissible state aid. 
Defining positive criteria of state aid policy 
The Commission’s soft law mainly deals with the exceptions to the state aid prohibition, 
thereby explicitly addressing questions of state aid policy. Early Commission rules built on 
the wording of the Treaty provisions on compatible state aid, in particular on Article 87(3)(c) 
of the EC Treaty. This provision was interpreted to mean that compatible state aid should be   13 
targeted towards specific sectors (“certain economic activities”) or specific regions (“certain 
economic areas”). The Commission started with developing criteria for sectoral state aid in 
the textiles and clothing industry in 1971; primary guidelines on regional state aid have been 
applied by the Commission since 1972 (Rawlinson 1993: 54). Apart from the first framework 
on environmental aid in 1975, however, it was not until state aid control was tightened in the 
second half of the 1980s (see Cini and McGowan 1998: 144–146) that soft law on other 
categories of compatible aid was developed. By clarifying the rules, and thus increasing legal 
certainty  for  permissible  types  of  state  aid,  the  Commission  provided  incentives  to  bring 
national state aid polices in line with its own priorities.  
The first framework on state aid for research and development (R&D) in 1986 marked a 
shift within the Commission towards such a more positive approach to state aid control (Cini 
and  McGowan  1998:  154).  The  framework  was  later  expanded  in  order  to  include 
“innovation-related aid,” which was justified by explicit reference to the Lisbon objectives 
(European Commission 2006a). The promotion of SMEs became a major concern within the 
context of European state aid control in the late 1980s (Lavdas and Mendrinou 1999). Today, 
many state aid rules include more generous exceptions for SMEs than for large enterprises. 
When the guidelines on environmental aid were reviewed recently, the Commission asked in 
its questionnaire to interested parties whether additional categories such as aid for the “safety 
of civilians and their environment” or for the “health of consumers” should be introduced. 
The final version of the guidelines significantly increases the threshold for admissible levels 
of environmental aid,  and this move is justified by explicit reference  to the “Energy  and 
Climate Change package” of the Commission (European Commission 2008).  
The Commission’s State Aid Action Plan calls for “less and better targeted state aid,” 
referring  to  a  similar  plea  of  the  Stockholm  European  Council  in  2001  (European 
Commission 2005). Large parts of the document focus on positively defining “better targeted 
aid” rather than on tightening state aid control (“less aid”). The introductory chapter puts state   14 
aid policy in the “context of the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs” (ibid.: 3–8). The core 
chapter lists “key priorities” of state aid policy such as “targeting innovation and R&D to 
strengthen  the  knowledge  society,”  “creating  a  better  business  climate  and  stimulating 
entrepreneurship” and “encouraging an environmentally sustainable future” (ibid.: 8–12). The 
concluding chapter outlines the main steps for revising soft and hard law on admissible state 
aid (ibid.: 12–18).  
Most of today’s aid categories do not follow from the wording of the Treaty provisions 
(Mestmäcker  and  Schweitzer  2004:  1110)  –  they  rather  indicate  the  evolution  of  the 
Commission’s own state aid policy priorities. The types of state aid which are not sector-
specific have been gradually subsumed under the term “horizontal aid.” At the same time, 
horizontal aid has become largely synonymous with “good” or “modern” state aid that is in 
line with the Commission’s own priorities. First of all, horizontal aid is regarded as being less 
distortive to competition than sectoral aid (Friederiszick et al. 2006: 27). More importantly, it 
contributes to the Commission’s own market-correcting or redistributive policy goals, and 
therefore  can  be  linked  to  an  objective  of  “common  interest.”  The  Commission’s 
methodology shows that the distinction between horizontal and sectoral aid is far from self-
evident, but it is meant to delineate “good” from “bad” state aid. The rules for rescue and 
restructuring  aid do not discriminate between sectors – however, this type of state  aid is 
regarded as particularly distortive to competition and is therefore counted as sectoral aid. In 
contrast, regional aid is mostly counted as horizontal aid, although it discriminates between 
different regions.
2 
Regional  aid  control  provides  a  telling  example  of  how  national  state  aid  policies 
increasingly  have  to  adjust  to  the  Commission’s  positive  interpretation  of  the  “common 
interest.”  Earlier  guidelines  on  national  regional  aid  were  already  less  concerned  with 
distortions of competition or trade between Member States and more “with the substance of 
regional policy” (Wishlade 2003: 89, emphasis in the original text). Regional aid was seen as   15 
a  legitimate  instrument  to  improve  cohesion.  However,  the  guidelines  represented  a 
compromise between two different views of cohesion, namely national cohesion and intra-
Community  cohesion.  Regions  which  were  seriously  underdeveloped  relative  to  the 
Community  average  could  receive  state  aid  based  on  Article  87(3)(a)  of  the  EC  Treaty; 
regions which were disadvantaged in relation to their national average were eligible for state 
aid on the much more restrictive basis of Article 87(3)(c). In a “non-paper” preparing the 
revision of the regional aid guidelines for the period 2007–2013, the Commission proposed to 
phase out entirely the second category of aid and only allow regional aid that contributes to 
the objective of intra-Community cohesion (Battista 2005). This proposal met with strong 
opposition from some of the richer Member States, expressed in a joint letter from the UK, 
France, Germany and Austria to Commissioner Kroes. Eventually, the Commission had to 
make concessions to these Member States, but the possibilities for  granting regional aid on 
the  basis  of  national  cohesion  objectives  have  nonetheless  been  significantly  constrained 
(Fothergill 2006: 10–19).  
By defining criteria of well-targeted state aid at the European level, the Commission 
increases the burden of proof on the Member States. While the Commission itself largely 
assumes that any state aid measure will distort competition (Wishlade 2003: 10), Member 
States must prove the admissibility of their state aid measures. The Commission requires them 
“to  provide  the  necessary  evidence  in  this  respect,  prior  to  any  implementation  of  the 
envisaged measure” (European Commission 2005: 6). Moreover, according to the “refined 
economic approach” advocated in the SAAP, Member states  not only have to identify a clear 
objective  of  common  interests  in  order  to  get  Commission  approval,  but  their  state  aid 
measures are required to be more efficient than alternative instruments in reaching their goals 
(ibid.: 6). In its comment on the SAAP, the German government was very critical of this 
proposition: “The Commission possesses the competence neither to allocate resources nor to 
harmonise  legal  and  financial  policies  nor  to  evaluate  the  success  of  national  state  aid   16 
policies”. Nevertheless, the Commission has since introduced a so-called “incentive test” into 
new soft law provisions, according to which the Member States must prove that a certain state 
aid measure “enables the beneficiary to carry out activities or projects which it would not 
have carried out as such in the absence of the aid” in order to get Commission approval 
(Evans and Nyssens 2007: 4). 
Binding the Member States 
In order to have a real impact on national state aid policies, the Commission needed to find 
ways to make its soft law practically binding for the Member States. Firstly, the Commission 
imposes its soft law on the Member States through individual state aid decisions. While soft 
law binds only the Commission itself, Commission decisions on individual state aid cases are 
binding for the Member States. Member States still have the right to draw up new state aid 
measures  that  do  not  match  the  Commission  criteria  set  out  in  its  soft  law;  most  likely, 
however, the Commission will then either force Member States to adapt the state aid measure 
in  question,  or  it  will  come  to  a  negative  decision  on  the  measure  and  prohibit  its 
implementation. If Member States are unwilling to adapt their measures, the Commission has 
created significant negative incentives for the potential beneficiaries of state  aid. Just the 
threat to prolong its control procedure and to order the possible recovery of illegal aid creates 
significant legal uncertainty for the firms, and this uncertainty may be sufficient to discourage 
them from demanding potentially inadmissible aid in the first place. The low rate of negative 
Commission decisions on state aid thus does not prove the ineffectiveness of European state 
aid control. Rather, Member States often anticipate Commission control and try to frame their 
state aid measures in a way that fits the criteria positively defined in state aid soft law (Smith 
1996).
3  
Secondly,  the  Commission  has  developed  a  mechanism  to  force  Member  States  to 
explicitly approve its soft law on state aid, and even to adapt existing state aid measures that   17 
were  previously  declared  compatible  with  the  rules  prior  to  revision.  If  a  Member  State 
refuses to accept the revised soft law, the Commission threatens to open formal investigations 
into all existing state aid measures that fall under the new rules, which “will normally have 
the  effect  of  forcing  the  Member  State  concerned  to  accept  the  Commission’s  policy” 
(Quigley  2003:  282f.).  The  Commission  has  had  repeated  success  with  this  strategy,  e.g. 
getting the approval of Spain and Germany for its framework on state aid to the motor vehicle 
industry  (Cini  2001:  201f)  and  forcing  Sweden  to  accept  the  revision  of  this  framework 
(Quigley  2003:  284).  The  most  recent  conflict  in  which  the  Commission  resorted  to  this 
strategy concerned the revised guidelines on regional aid. After winning the approval of 24 
EU Member States, with only Germany refusing to accept the new rules, the Commission 
opened an investigation into all German regional aid schemes. The title of the Commission’s 
press release – “formal investigation against Germany” (emphasis added) – already reveals 
the punitive character of this measure.
4 In individual state aid cases, the Commission usually 
uses  more  neutral  language  (“investigations  into”)  and  emphasizes  that  opening  a  formal 
investigation does not prejudice its final decision on whether the proposed aid is admissible. 
As for the new guidelines on regional aid, the Commission closed its formal investigation 
once Germany had finally approved the revised rules. 
These examples show the limits of this Commission strategy: only if a broad majority of 
Member  States  agree  with  its  soft  law  can  the  Commission  credibly  threaten  individual 
Member States and force them into final approval. In order to build a broad consensus, the 
Commission  consults  Member  States  in  “multilateral  meetings”  during  the  development 
process for soft state aid law. The status of these meetings is similar to that of the consultation 
of the Advisory Committee on State Aid under the Procedural Regulation: the Commission 
has the final say. The guidelines for regional state aid in the period 2000–2006, for example, 
were discussed in three multilateral meetings. Even after the last multilateral meeting,  an   18 
important modification was introduced by the Commission into the final document, without 
prior coordination with the Member States (Méndez et al. 2006: 593). 
Sooner or later, the Commission’s soft law becomes practically binding even for the 
minority of Member States who initially refuse approval. From the Commission’s point of 
view, state aid soft law is therefore no less binding than traditional secondary legislation: 
“The force of written precedents in the Commission is such that, once decided, rules in whatever form 
become, in practice, binding on the Commission, and hence on their addressees, the Member States, to 
whom they are applied in the Commission’s day-to-day aid control work.” (Rawlinson 1993: 59) 
 
Table 2: EU State Aid Scoreboard on state aid levels and objectives, 1992-2006 
 
  EU-12  EU-15  EU-25 
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Total aid as % 
of GDP 
 
0,8 
 
0,8 
 
0,8 
 
0,7 
 
0,7 
 
0,9 
 
0,6 
 
0,4 
 
0,4 
 
0,5 
 
0,5 
 
0,4 
 
0,4 
 
0,4 
 
0,4 
Horizontal aid 
as % of  ttl. aid 
 
52,2 
 
48,9 
 
45,3 
 
54,7 
 
54,8 
 
39,1 
 
57,7 
 
67,1 
 
69,6 
 
67,2 
 
66,9 
 
79,3 
 
76,3 
 
82,9 
 
85,2 
Horizontal aid 
in billion € 
 
34,3 
 
32,3 
 
27,4 
 
32,1 
 
31,9 
 
30,8 
 
28,9 
 
27,0 
 
29,6 
 
30,8 
 
33,9 
 
33,0 
 
36,2 
 
39,2 
 
40,8 
 
The Commission has developed two broad indicators for “less and better targeted” state aid. 
The amount of state aid in relation to the GDP is called the state aid level. As for the state aid 
objectives, the Commission distinguishes between sectoral and horizontal state aid. The goal 
of reducing state aid levels is being met: data from the EU State Aid Scoreboard clearly 
indicates a drop in national state aid expenditures since the early 1990s (see Table 2). Earlier 
studies on EU Member States’ aid policies come to the same conclusions and attribute the 
reduction of overall state aid levels to the impact of European state aid control (Smith 1996: 
575; Wolf 2005: 87; Aydin 2007). More importantly for the argument of this article, we can 
observe a clear redirection of state aid towards horizontal objectives, and thus an alignment of 
national  state  aid  policies  with  the  Commission’s  policy  goals.  Furthermore,  while  the 
reduction of overall state aid levels seems to have reached its limits, the trend towards higher 
shares of horizontal state aid is still ongoing. Since 1999, we can observe an absolute rise in 
state  aid  towards  horizontal  objectives.  Nonetheless,  these  Scoreboard  figures  have  to  be 
treated  with  caution:  Knowing  that  horizontal  aid  is  more  likely  to  be  accepted  by  the   19 
Commission,  Member  states  may  try  to  reframe  old  policies,  rhetorically  rather  than 
substantively, to make them fit with the Commission’s priorities. 
Transforming mature soft law into hard law 
It  was  only  in  1998  that  the  Commission  and  the  Council  agreed  to  adopt  secondary 
legislation on state aid control. When, in 1990, the Italian Council presidency had proposed 
an initiative towards secondary legislation on state aid control, it was the Commission that 
refused to submit a new draft regulation (Smith 2001: 220). The Commission suspected that 
some Member States aimed to weaken state aid control by involving themselves more deeply 
in  state  aid  regulation.  The  main  reason  why  the  Commission  reconsidered  its  position 
towards hard state aid law was increased workload. The number of investigations had risen 
due to the expanded scope of state aid control, more systematic notifications by Member 
States of their state aid measures, and more frequent complaints from enterprises about illegal 
state aid (Mederer 1996: 12f.). Because of its limited human resources, the Commission had 
to get rid of minor state aid cases in order to concentrate on the most important and difficult 
ones. Moreover, soft law had become “sufficiently precise” in some areas to be applied in a 
more decentralized way (ibid.: 13). 
Based on the Enabling Regulation No. 994/1998, the Commission has now adopted 
several  Block  Exemption  Regulations  (BERs)  which  allow  Member  States  to  implement 
certain state aid measures without ex ante approval by the Commission. To a large extent, 
these  BERs  consist  of  previously  soft  state  aid  rules.  As  in  the  case  of  soft  law,  the 
Commission enjoys autonomy in the design of these rules – only the Advisory Committee on 
State  Aid  has  to  be  consulted.  The  first  generation  of  BERs  concerned  SME  (small  and 
medium-sized enterprises) aid, training aid, employment aid and small amounts of state aid – 
so-called de minimis aid. The second generation of BERs specifically addressed state aid in 
the  agriculture  and  fishery  sectors.  In  2006,  the  Commission  mostly  exempted  regional   20 
investment aid. Finally, in 2008, a general BER was adopted – subsuming previous BER and 
additionally  exempting  environmental  aid  as  well  as  aid  for  innovation,  research  and 
development.  
Exempting  state  aid  from  ex  ante  control  does  not  only  reduce  the  Commission’s 
workload, it also gives back some autonomy to the Member States – as long as their state aid 
policies  are  in  line  with  the  BERs’  criteria.  By  exempting  certain  types  of  state  aid,  the 
Commission creates further incentives to adjust national policies to its own state aid priorities. 
The Commission explicitly states that BERs are designed to “facilitate the possibilities for 
Member States to grant subsidies that clearly fulfill horizontal objectives in line with the 
European  Union’s  Lisbon  objectives  (such  as  environmental  protection,  or  promotion  of 
research and development)” (European Commission 2007a).  
 
Table 3  State aid measures under the block exemptions regulations (2001–2007, *until 09/2007) 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007* 
SME  102  123  139  149  197  183  246 
Training  48  80  55  79  69  57  86 
Employment  –  –  8  21  26  35  27 
Agriculture  –  –  –  72  88  119  307 
Fishery  –  –  –  1  22  24  0 
Regional  –  –  –  –  –  –  154 
Total  150  203  202  322  401  418  820 
 
A Commission report to the European Parliament and the Council shows that Member 
States increasingly resort to state aid measures falling under the BERs (European Commission 
2006b, 2007b: 33). The number of state aid measures which need to be presented to and 
approved  by  the  Commission  has  decreased  significantly  in  areas  in  which  BERs  exist; 
accordingly, the number of registered measures under the BERs has constantly risen (see 
Table 3). Comments on the Commission’s plan to exempt additional categories of aid have 
been largely positive: drafting a general BER and raising the limit for de minimis aid were   21 
among the Commission propositions in the SAAP which received the most support (European 
Commission 2006c: 6f.).  
Conclusion: The limits of positive integration from above  
European state aid control has moved beyond purely negative integration. The Commission 
has been the major driving force of this process, through its interpretation of the EC Treaty 
provisions and its development of soft and hard rules on admissible state aid. Today, BERs 
are as close to positive integration as state aid control can possibly get, with regard to their 
form  as  well  as  their  content.  They  harmonize  the  possible  exceptions  to  the  state  aid 
prohibition in Article 87 (1) of the EC Treaty. Many potential conflicts about weighing the 
goal of undistorted competition against other goals of state aid policy, therefore, no longer 
arise at the European level in individual state aid cases. It has been shown that EU Member 
States increasingly resort to state aid measures falling under the BERs, and that their state aid 
policies are converging towards the horizontal objectives advocated by the Commission.  
Two  factors  have  been  responsible  for  the  Commission’s  ability  to  act  as  a 
supranational  entrepreneur  of  positive  integration:  vague  Treaty  rules  and  heterogeneous 
Member States’ interests. EC Treaty rules reflect the conflicting policy goals in the field of 
state aid and they entrust the Commission to balance them in concrete cases. The ECJ has 
limited the scope of European state aid control and checks the Commission’s practices for 
procedural correctness, but it largely follows a policy of “judicial self-restraint” with regard to 
the  underlying  assessment  of  admissible  state  aid.  Member  States’  conflicting  views  on 
national state aid policies meant that they were initially unwilling to agree upon secondary 
rules, and later were unable to counter the Commission’s increasingly complex and detailed 
vision  of  “good”  state  aid  policy  (Cini  and  McGowan  1998:  123).  Essentially,  the 
Commission’s strategy can be described as one of “lesser evil” (Schmidt 2000: 50) from the 
Member  States’  perspective.  Compared  to  case-by-case  control,  state  aid  soft  law  has   22 
improved legal certainty, and, rather than being exclusively oriented toward competition, it 
left  some  scope  for  the  design  of  national  state  aid  policies.  Compared  to  the  remaining 
uncertainties  under  soft  law,  particularly  those  arising  from  lengthy  Commission 
investigations, directly applicable BERs further clarify the remaining possibilities of national 
policy makers and relieve them from burdensome notification procedures. In exchange, the 
Commission gains influence on national state aid policies. 
Where, however, are the limits on this positive integration from above? First of all, and 
most importantly, European state aid rules do not establish a full-fledged European state aid 
policy. The Commission cannot oblige national governments to spend state aid on particular 
purposes, i.e. to implement a harmonized state aid policy. The ultimate decision to grant state 
aid remains a national competence, and Member States still enjoy significant choice between 
different types of admissible aid when it comes to the specific state aid targets. 
Table 4  European state aid control between the poles of negative and positive integration 
Negative integration 
 
↔ 
European state aid control 
 
Positive integration
– State aid prohibition 
– Only exception:  
  undistortive state aid 
￿ State aid prohibition  
(not absolute);  
harmonization of possible  
exceptions (admissible aid) ￿ 
– Harmonization of national 
state aid policies
– Community aid 
 
 
Furthermore, as has already been mentioned, the Commission cannot issue and enforce soft 
law or BERs against strong Member state opposition. Simultaneous conflicts with numerous 
Member states would easily overstrain the Commission’s limited enforcement capacities in 
individual cases. The Commission must build as broad a consensus as possible during the 
process of rule-making. The revision of the guidelines on regional aid illustrates this point: 
after  opposition  from  France,  Germany  and  the  UK,  the  Commission  had  to  modify  its 
original  proposal.  Yet  there  is  good  reason  to  interpret  the  Commission’s  first  draft  as 
strategically radical, drafted to ensure that a compromise would still have a clear impact on 
Member States’ regional aid policies (Fothergill 2006: 15). Another example shows the limits   23 
of  the  Commission’s  autonomy  more  clearly:  because  state  aid  to  firms  in  financial 
difficulties heavily distorts competition, the Commission advocates strict limitations on these 
measures (Mestmäcker and Schweitzer 2004: 1125f.). Nevertheless, Member States continue 
to grant such aid. This is reflected in the guidelines on rescue and restructuring aid which are 
often criticized as being too lenient (Nicolaides and Kekelekis 2005). In this case, it is the 
Commission which has apparently accepted the “lesser evil” of the existing rules rather than 
outright non-compliance with stricter rules.  
Finally, depending on the (im)precision of secondary rules, Member States can try to 
adjust  their  national  policies  rhetorically  rather  than  substantively  to  the  Commission’s 
criteria.  They  can  relabel  old  forms  of  state  aid  in  order  to  gain  approval  from  the 
Commission. The less precise the Commission’s rules on admissible state aid, the easier it 
becomes for Member States to justify distortive state aid on this basis. In the past, the regional 
aid  guidelines  have  sometimes  been  considered  to  create  such  loopholes  (Dylla  1998). 
Whether  the  recently  adopted  framework  on  research,  development  and  innovation  aid  is 
sufficiently  precise  remains  to  be  seen;  the  new  category  of  innovation  aid  has  been 
particularly criticized for its lack of precision (Ehricke 2005). Thus, by pushing even further 
towards a harmonization of admissible state aid, i.e. in the direction of positive integration, 
the Commission might run the risk of undermining the negative integration it has achieved so 
far. 
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Notes 
 
1  For  the  United  Kingdom’s  and  other  countries’  responses  to  the  SAAP,  see  online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/reform/comments_saap/index.html [All cited 
websites were last accessed 10 October 2008].  
2 See online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/conceptual_remarks.html. 
3  This  is  most  obvious  in  the  case  of  so-called  state  aid  schemes,  i.e.  national  programs 
involving a multitude of state aid measures but which require Commission notification and 
approval only once. Very often, e.g. in the case of regional investment programs, these state aid 
schemes constitute a more or less comprehensive transposition of the Commission’s soft rules 
into national law. 
4 Commission Press Release IP/06/851: “State Aid: 24 Member States Accept New Regional 
Aid Guidelines (2007–2013); Commission Opens Formal Investigation against Germany.”  